University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2013

Juries for Juveniles
Joseph E. Kennedy
University of North Carolina School of Law, kennedy4@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Texas Tech Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

JURIES FOR JUVENILES
Joseph E. Kennedy*
I. PART I ................................................................................................. 292
II. PART II ................................................................................................ 294
III. PART III ............................................................................................... 298
Widespread agreement exists that too many juveniles are being tried as
adults. Agreement breaks down over what is to be done. Some propose
abolition of adult court jurisdiction over juveniles; many others propose
some combination of categorical limits on transferring juveniles to adult
court. Still others propose abolishing juvenile court altogether and
according juveniles special treatment within the adult system or replacing
juvenile court with some sort of civil regime.
Discussion of juvenile justice reform has been stimulated by the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Roper v. Simmons1 and Miller v.
Alabama.2 The Court’s abolition of the death penalty for juveniles and its
requirement of some measure of individualized consideration for the
imposition of life sentences without the possibility of parole have expanded
the sense of what may be possible in the foreseeable future.
The major obstacle to reform remains punitive attitudes about juvenile
culpability that took root during a series of “moral panics” in the 1980s and
1990s that remain deeply entrenched among many of the state legislators
who hold it in their power to change juvenile court transfer policies.3
Whatever the extent of the general softening in attitudes towards juveniles
in society, many legislators remain afraid of being seen as soft on crime—a
fear that is fortified each time a juvenile anywhere in this very populous
society commits a heartless crime.
At such a time, the challenge for legal scholarship is to strike the right
balance between idealism and realism. Reforms predicated upon a
completely enlightened polity are too idealistic to be useful. Like the
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when
their crimes were committed”).
2. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (holding that mandatory sentences of life
without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders).
3. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 9–10 (1972). Stanley Cohen coined the
term “moral panic” and was probably the first sociologist to study and analyze moral panics in a study of
British “Mods” and “Rockers” published in 1972. Id.
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economist in the joke who is trapped on a desert island with only canned
food, but no utensils, and tells his fellow survivors that they simply need to
“assume a can opener,” reformers cannot simply assume the conditions
necessary for their success. Likewise, reforms that simply tinker at the
edges of what currently seems politically feasible fail to make the most of
the emerging change in attitudes. Few would have predicted the emergence
of Eighth Amendment limits on noncapital sentences for juveniles a few
years ago. What might be possible five years from now?
The challenge, therefore, is to identify reforms that are sufficiently
aspirational to be meaningful, but that are also sufficiently realistic to
inspire political support today. Such reforms would be designed for the
second-best world in which we live; but ideally, they should, themselves,
serve as stepping stones to an even better world that might become possible
farther down the road—a world that might, conceivably, be brought about
by future Supreme Court decisions.
In this spirit, I propose a very different type of legislative reform for
juvenile transfer: a legislatively created right to a jury trial on the issue of
whether juveniles should be sentenced as juveniles or as adults. Part I will
briefly sketch the outlines of my proposal.4 Part II will describe the
prevailing political constraints on juvenile justice reform by describing the
most salient features of recent moral panics about crime, in general, and
juvenile crime in particular.5 Part III will explain the advantages of my
proposal in responding to these constraints and a few possible objections.6
Part III will also briefly describe the ways in which such a practice might
eventually lead to a constitutional right to such a jury trial at some point in
the future.7
I. PART I
Juveniles should enjoy a jury trial “right of last resort” on the issue of
whether they should be sentenced as juveniles or adults. This right would
not preclude earlier determinations by judges or prosecutors as to whether
the juvenile should be transferred to adult court in the first place, but those
determinations notwithstanding, juveniles would still be allowed to demand
a jury trial on the issue of whether they should be sentenced as adults or as
juveniles. The jury would not determine the sentence itself, but it would
have the last word as to which sentencing regime—adult or juvenile—
would apply to the case at hand. The jury would, in essence, be entrusted
with what might best be described as a threshold sentencing decision,
although not with sentencing itself. Such a requirement would, in effect,
4.
5.
6.
7.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
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function as a right of last resort for juveniles who have already been
transferred to adult court for adjudication of guilt, but who wish to
challenge the decision to sentence them as adults one final time.
The most logical way for such a right to operate would be in a
bifurcated trial where the same jury that heard evidence of guilt and
innocence would also hear, in a separate phase, evidence as to whether adult
or juvenile sentencing would be most appropriate. Like the sentencing
phase of a capital trial, the jury would hear evidence from both the
prosecution and the defense that would, in effect, seek to aggravate or
mitigate the sentence to be imposed. The criteria to be used for this
threshold sentencing decision would be the same criteria currently used for
transfer proceedings in the jurisdiction, with whatever modifications
necessary to make the criteria more intelligible to laypersons. Likewise,
during this phase, the jury would be privy to all of the same information
available to a judge at a transfer hearing, including the range of available
sentencing options in both juvenile and adult court.8 For this reason,
however, the threshold sentencing decision by the jury would have to
follow, not precede, the guilt phase of the trial—lest the impartiality of the
jury be compromised in favor of either guilt or innocence. While all that
the jury learned about the nature of the offense would be probative on the
issue of sentencing, much of what the jury would learn during the
sentencing phase would not be probative on guilt and might well be highly
prejudicial on that issue. A juvenile’s history of past abuse and neglect
might arouse the sympathy of the jury and lead to an unjust acquittal.
Similarly, a juvenile’s history of multiple or serious prior criminal offenses
might arouse the jury’s hatred and fear and lead to an unjust conviction.
Such a right would obviously impose an additional burden on the
prosecution. Proving guilt before a jury instead of a judge is more time
consuming and possibly more difficult. Even after the greater effort and the
increased risk of an acquittal, a prosecution might, nonetheless, result in a
juvenile court sentence. As will be discussed at greater length in Part II,
however, the greater burden is an appropriate safeguard to ensure that adult
sentencing of juvenile offenders takes place only when appropriate.9
Moreover, the juvenile could waive this jury right of last resort. One
could expect that prosecutors might charge or plea-bargain with a juvenile
in order to receive such a waiver. Allowing this right to be subject to the
prevailing practices of charge and plea bargaining is probably necessary to
make the proposal politically feasible, given the great volume of juvenile
cases where transfer has become an issue. For this reason, the right confers
8. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: Comparing
Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Two States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331, 344
(2005) (finding that in Virginia and Arkansas, sentences imposed during jury trials are typically stiffer
for many offenses than sentences following either a guilty plea or bench trial).
9. See infra Part II.
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additional leverage upon the juvenile in these negotiations. This additional
leverage, however, would be distributed in a proportionate and desirable
way. The greater the likelihood that—all things considered—a jury might
convict a juvenile, yet only sentence him as a juvenile, the greater the
pressure on the prosecutor to seek an agreement on a juvenile sentence in
the first instance, or to insist only on an adult sentence that is truly
proportionate to the offense and to the offender. The shadow of the jury
would constrain the power of the prosecutor in a useful way.
Such a right might also influence judges in both good and bad ways.
Judges who believe that a jury might ultimately reject adult court
sentencing would have an incentive to save the judicial system the time and
expense of a jury trial by keeping the case in juvenile court. On the other
hand, judges who wish to avoid politically difficult decisions about
transfers might simply “kick the can” to the jury in order to avoid
responsibility for the outcome. Such can-kicking is also possible for
prosecutors, but both prosecutors and judges would have good reason to
kick only those cans that have a reasonable chance of being handled by the
jury in a way favorable to their respective interests.
One might expect, therefore, that the mere prospect of the jury making
this threshold sentencing decision might decrease somewhat the power both
judges and prosecutors have to sentence juveniles as adults. Certainly, one
might expect that fewer of the less serious property and drug offenses might
be transferred. As to the serious and violent offenses that have largely
driven the trend toward adult court transfer, juries could be expected to
refuse adult court sentencing only in those cases where truly compelling
mitigating circumstances exist. Whether limiting adult sentencing in such a
way would be a good thing is the next question to be addressed.
II. PART II
It is beyond the scope of this short essay to make the case that too
many juveniles are sentenced as adults. Numerous books and articles have
made this argument at length and in depth.10 These works have also
10. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 11
(2008) (arguing, as others also have, that “[a]fter more than a decade of steadily declining juvenile crime
rates,” punitive legal reforms should be mitigated with more rehabilitative interventions); see also John
D. Burrow, Punishing Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Case Study of Michigan’s Prosecutorial Waiver
Statute, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 41 (2005) (noting that “African-American juvenile offenders
were disproportionately waived to adult court”); Sarah M. Greathouse et al., The Potentially Biasing
Effects of Voir Dire in Juvenile Waiver Cases, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 427, 427 (2011) (noting that in
the past twenty years, “concern with crime-control resulted in a growing number of laws designed to
adjudicate juvenile offenses within the adult criminal justice system”); Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are
Different:” Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 27–30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191711 (arguing that too many juveniles
were tried as adults in the recent past); Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future
of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 537–41 (2013) (arguing that this is a result of the

2013]

JURIES FOR JUVENILES

295

discussed the political and social dynamics that have led to overly broad
transfer practices—a chronic series of moral panics about juvenile crime in
general and juvenile violence in particular.11 These moral panics, however,
have certain defining features that have not been sufficiently appreciated. A
fuller understanding of the nature of our anxieties about juveniles and the
crimes they commit provides us with both a realistic sense of the limits of
what reforms one might expect to attract political support, as well as a
better sense of what types of reforms would assuage, rather than exacerbate,
the anxieties that have created the second-best world of juvenile-crime
politics within which we must function.
Suffice it to say that, through a combination of practices, too many
juveniles are being transferred to adult court. Statutory exclusion and direct
filing provisions result in the mandatory transfer of juveniles charged with
certain types of offenses, regardless of the circumstances of the offense or
offender. In other jurisdictions, the creation of presumptions that transfer is
appropriate in certain types of juvenile offenses produces the same result.
Even in the absence of such practices, many judges are simply transferring
too many juveniles after transfer hearings, many for offenses that are much
less serious than the violent offenses that are the subject of the more
mandatory mechanisms created by state legislatures. The net result is that a
large number of juveniles have simply been returned to the bad old days of
the pre-juvenile court era, in which no meaningful distinction was made
between adults and juveniles for the purposes of criminal liability.
Understanding how we arrived at such transfer practices is essential to
striking the optimal balance between realism and idealism in reforming
them. The indiscriminate transfer of juveniles to adult court developed in
response to a series of moral panics about juvenile crimes that have been
1990s’ “moral panics”); Prateek Shukla, The Criminal Child and Its Potential for Change: A
Presumption in Favor of Rehabilitation in Sentencing Juvenile Offenders, 38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 379, 382, 39–93 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing CLEMENS F.
BARTOLLAS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 185 (4th ed. 1997)) (arguing that fewer juveniles need to be
sentenced as adults and that a presumption in favor of rehabilitating the juvenile offender would disrupt
the juvenile’s “process of becoming deviant”); Benjamin Adams & Sean Addie, Delinquency Cases
Waived to Criminal Court, 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 2 (2012), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239080.
pdf (noting that the number of juveniles waived to criminal court “was greater in 2009 than in 1985 for
person, drug, and public order offense cases”); Sarah Hockenberry, Person Offenses Cases in Juvenile
Court, 2008, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 2 (2011), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236480.pdf (showing that
4,400 of the petitioned cases were judicially waived to criminal court); Crystal Knoll & Melissa
Sickmund, Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court, 2008, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 3 (2011), http://www.
ojjdp.gov/pubs/236479.pdf (showing that “[i]n 2008, juvenile court judges waived jurisdiction over an
estimated 8,900 delinquency cases, sending them to criminal court”); Charles Puzzanchera et al.,
Juvenile Court Statistics 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 58 (2012), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239114.pdf
(showing that 7,600 of all formally processed delinquency cases in 2009 were judicially transferred to
criminal court). But see, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY
COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 11, 91
(1996) (rebutting the “unthinking assertions about ‘too many’ [juveniles] behind bars” by arguing that
“virtually all of those in prison . . . are . . . deserving enough . . . to merit secure confinement”).
11. See sources cited supra note 10.
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widely discussed.12 Missing from that discussion, however, has been a
clear understanding of how those moral panics influenced the crime politics
of the era. The juvenile crime panics of the 1980s and 1990s constituted a
morality play of sorts that the public never seemed to tire of seeing
reenacted. This morality play involved three main characters: a monstrous
offender, a neglected victim, and a soft-hearted judge. The monstrous
offender was typically a sociopath who preyed upon innocent people
without remorse. The soft-hearted judge was the government official—
typically a judge, but sometimes a prosecutor or parole board—who was
too caught up in sympathy for and understanding of the offender to
recognize his obvious evil. The neglected victim was the blameless
innocent who suffered at the hands of the monstrous offender who had been
released by the soft-hearted judge.13
The juvenile-offender moral panics of the 1980s and 1990s fit
perfectly into this larger narrative about crime and punishment in
contemporary American society. Juvenile offenders during this time were
seen as a “new breed”14 of remorseless “superpredators”15 who were not
being held responsible for their crimes because judges—and sometimes
prosecutors—were blinded to the juveniles’ obvious evil by the offenders’
tender age. Those who argued on the basis of neuroscience or
developmental psychology that juveniles should not be held fully
responsible for their crimes were simply scientific versions of the softhearted judges who were unable to recognize the obvious evil of this new
breed of kids.
Like any good story, the morality play about juvenile crime drew its
appeal from powerful emotions experienced by its audience. Two
emotions, in particular, energized juvenile-justice punitivism: a fear of
moral decline and a distrust of experts. The reason judges, legislators, and
prosecutors did not see the obvious evil of juvenile offenders was that they
were too caught up in the moral relativism of the times. Everyone had an
excuse for everything because the rightness or wrongness of a particular
12. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE xi–xiii (1998) (arguing that there is
no greater protection from the creation of “general policies toward children and adolescents permeated
with fear and hostility” than reason and perspective); see also Burrow, supra note 10, at 12–13 (noting
Zimring’s “belief that judicial waiver decisions are arbitrary, capricious, and not guided by normative
legal standards”).
13. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 831, 905–07 (2000) (arguing that the “unprecedented increase in the
severity of criminal punishment in the United States” reflects anxiety about social cohesion); see also
Joseph E. Kennedy, The Punitive Society (forthcoming) (on file with author).
14. See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”:
The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 641 (2002);
see also BENNETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 194.
15. The term “superpredator” was coined by John DiIlulio, who sounded the alarm about a coming
wave of violent dangerous youths growing up in moral poverty. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 28;
John J. DiIlulio Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23.
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choice was seen as relative to the circumstances of the offense and offender.
The abuse of excuses flowed from and contributed to an overall decline in
moral responsibility. In the words of one bumper sticker, “[i]t’s not my
fault that I never learned to accept responsibility.”16
Experts were seen as complicit in this moral decline because they
substituted specialized knowledge for the simpler common sense that was
seen as necessary to tell right from wrong. The unspoken assumption was
that such experts came from a social and educational elite that had lost
touch with the realities of crime. Their intellectualized view of morality
and character blinded them to the simpler and more widely shared truths
about human behavior that emerge from a more common experience of
people and society. So far removed from the conditions under which crime
occurs, they failed to see the ways in which diminished legal responsibility
would make life unlivable in many communities. They also failed to
appreciate the emotive side of punishment—the ways in which punishment
gives meaning to the suffering of crime victims and the ways in which
diminished criminal responsibility would rob those victims of a collective
moral meaning that they need to make sense of their sufferings. Such
experts are too blinded by theories about how someone might have behaved
under more favorable circumstances to hold them accountable for how they
did behave in the real world in which we all must live.
These two emotions combined powerfully in debates about juvenile
justice. People who argued that juveniles should be punished less harshly
on account of their tender age were bleeding hearts with soft heads and
whose sentimental sympathies blinded them to the malevolence of the new
breed. Developmental psychologists who argued that the brain of the
juvenile offender was materially—but not permanently—different from the
adult brain, or criminologists who questioned the empirical premise of the
“new breed” were point-headed intellectuals out of touch with what was
happening on the streets. In such an emotional landscape, punitivism wins
either way.
The result of these rhetorical dynamics was what I have described
elsewhere as “criminal justice fundamentalism.” Because judgment cannot
be trusted to be sufficiently punitive, inflexible policies are put in place. At
the enforcement level, zero tolerance polices mandate suspension or
charging, regardless of context. With respect to charging, statutory
exclusion and direct filing provisions ensure that the decision to adjudicate
the juvenile as an adult is made solely by the prosecutor. Even in
jurisdictions that require judges to decide whether transfer to adult court is
appropriate, the list of charges that permit transfer was expanded. The idea
in each case is to combat moral relativism by sending a clear message that
16. ZAZZLE, http://www.zazzle.com/its_not_my_fault_bumper_sticker-128535928762839729 (last
visited Sept. 13, 2013) (emphasis omitted).

298

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:291

juveniles will be judged as adults and not relative to their age, and to entrust
the decision to do so, either entirely, or as much as possible, to prosecutors.
III. PART III
The emotional and rhetorical dynamics described have abated
somewhat, but remain powerful and continue to constrain juvenile justice
reform. The simplest and most direct way to reduce transfers of juveniles
to adult court would be to place categorical limits on what charges and
circumstances could justify such a transfer and to abolish statutory
exclusion and direct filing by prosecutors. That would, in essence, seem to
be fighting fire with fire: opposing categorical rules mandating or
expanding adult court jurisdiction over juveniles with categorical rules
restricting transfer. It is particularly tempting to argue for such a
categorical approach, given the growing expert consensus that juveniles are
neurologically different from adults in significant and previously
unappreciated ways and the general public’s growing interest in
neuroscience. Such an approach, while correct on the merits, would be a
mistake. A categorical ban on transferring juveniles to adult court, for
example, would fall in the wake of the next headline-grabbing case. In the
days leading up to this Symposium, a juvenile offender threatened a mother
pushing a baby carriage that he would shoot her baby in the face if she did
not comply with the juvenile offender’s demands during a robbery.17 When
she failed to comply quickly enough, the juvenile shot and killed the baby.18
Even if the offender in the above-mentioned case does not deserve to be
judged for his terrible actions by adult standards because of neurological
immaturity, such an argument would exacerbate, not mitigate, the punitive
energies that have been distorting our thinking about juvenile justice for the
last few decades. Rather than fighting fire with fire, a flat rule banning
transfer in such cases, justified on neuroscientific grounds, would be like
pouring kerosene on a fire. Such reforms get the balance between
aspiration and inspiration wrong by ignoring the continuing rhetorical
realities of the second-best world in which we live.
Creating a jury trial right of last resort on the issue of transfer from
juvenile court would better strike the balance between aspiration and
inspiration that is necessary in our second-best world. Juries would not
necessarily be the best decision-makers on this issue, but they would be the
most legitimate. What better counterpoint to populist concerns about
intellectual elites wrapped up in moral relativism than a jury drawn from
the community? To the degree that one looks at the very existence of
17. Russ Bynum, Police Arrest 2 Teens in Georgia Baby’s Killing, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 22,
2013, 8:27 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/police-ga-infant-killed-while-pushed-stroller-0.
18. Id.
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juvenile courts as an exercise in the mitigation of punishment, such a jury
right would have conceptual precedents. Voluntary manslaughter doctrine
mitigates liability for intentional killings by entrusting juries with the
judgment of whether the defendant was in his right mind or caught up in the
heat of passion at the time of the killing.19 To be sure, the judgment of the
jury would not have to be an uninformed one. Juries could consider
evidence from developmental psychologists and neuroscientists in the same
way that some juries consider expert testimony on the issue of battered
spouse syndrome.
My ambitions for such a reform are, concededly, modest. It would
probably not make things any better with respect to the most heinous crimes
that arouse the public’s passions, but given the current state of affairs, it
would not make things any worse, either. The baby-face-shooter would
probably be transferred in either regime, although the possibility exists that
a jury might not transfer if the juvenile’s background provided some
compelling explanation for such a terrible act. The biggest impact of the
jury trial right proposed would be in the mid- or low-level offenses that are
currently being transferred. More to the point, my proposal would have a
chance of being adopted in that middle range of states where they are
neither so liberal as to support more lenient measures, nor so punitive as to
preclude any reform at all. It is a second-best measure for our second-best
world.
A transfer jury trial right for juveniles might also serve as a stepping
stone to a slightly better world, however. A perplexing, but pragmatic,
aspect of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is the chicken-oregg quality of the role that emerging consensus plays. As more states
excluded juveniles from the death penalty, the practice became more cruel
and unusual, until a tipping point was reached where the practice became
unconstitutional. The chicken-or-egg quality comes, of course, from the
fact that the Court plays at least a modest role in the consensus that
emerges. The ban on executing the mentally retarded gave support to the
argument against executing juveniles. The consensus against executing
juveniles and its subsequent judicial enshrinement in the Eighth
Amendment stimulated a movement limiting the sentencing of juveniles to
life without the possibility of parole. The juvenile jury trial right proposed
would certainly satisfy Miller’s requirement of an individualized process.
More importantly, if enough states adopted it, a future court someday might
recognize the sort of emerging consensus that would make punishing a
juvenile as an adult in the absence of a jury cruel and unusual punishment.
Arguably, such a requirement would draw support from the Court’s Sixth
Amendment decisions recognizing jury trial rights with respect to offense
elements that had been considered the province of the sentencing judge.
19. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
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Arguably, a right to a jury determination of the threshold issue of whether
one is mature enough to be adjudicated as an adult is even more integral to
one’s right to trial than the elements of the offense. Such a prospect seems
unlikely, perhaps, but it may not be more unlikely than the prospect ten
years ago that the current Court would ban the execution of juveniles and
limit the imposition of life without the possibility of parole.
I have no illusions about how juries might exercise such a right. But
we live in a second-best world. Creating a role for juries in transfer
decisions might be a useful step in moving us towards a better one.

